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Статья опубликована в рамках: Научного журнала «Студенческий» № 29(325)

Рубрика журнала: Политология

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Библиографическое описание:
Molchanova P. HORIZONTAL POWER-SHARING AND ITS IMPACT ON STABILITY: IS PRESIDENTIALISM LESS CONDUCIVE TO STABLE DEMOCRACIES THAN PARLIAMENTARISM? // Студенческий: электрон. научн. журн. 2025. № 29(325). URL: https://sibac.info/journal/student/325/385062 (дата обращения: 24.09.2025).

HORIZONTAL POWER-SHARING AND ITS IMPACT ON STABILITY: IS PRESIDENTIALISM LESS CONDUCIVE TO STABLE DEMOCRACIES THAN PARLIAMENTARISM?

Molchanova Polina

Student, Saint-Petersburg school of social sciences, Higher School of Economics,

Russia, Saint-Petersburg

ГОРИЗОНТАЛЬНОЕ РАЗДЕЛЕНИЕ ВЛАСТИ И ЕГО ВЛИЯНИЕ НА СТАБИЛЬНОСТЬ: ЯВЛЯЕТСЯ ЛИ ПРЕЗИДЕНТАЛИЗМ МЕНЕЕ БЛАГОПРИЯТНЫМ ДЛЯ СТАБИЛЬНОСТИ ДЕМОКРАТИЙ, ЧЕМ ПАРЛАМЕНТАРИЗМ?

 

Молчанова Полина Юрьевна

студент, Санкт-Петербургская школа социальных наук, Высшая Школа Экономики,

РФ, г. Санкт-Петербург

 

ABSTRACT

Some political scientists, such as Juan Linz, believe that presidential systems are less capable of maintaining stability in democratic regimes than parliamentarism. To refute this position, this article will examine the features of parliamentarism that can potentially lead to regime instability and the features of presidentialism that, on the contrary, contribute to state stability. Consequently, it will be proved that both systems can have both positive and negative effects on regime stability, and that horizontal power-sharing is an important, but not fundamental, prerequisite for the stability of democracies.

АННОТАЦИЯ

Некоторые политические ученые, например, Линц Хуан, считают, что президентские системы менее способны к поддержанию стабильности в демократических режимах, в отличие от парламентаризма. Чтобы опровергнуть данную позицию, в этой статье будут рассмотрены черты парламентаризма, которые потенциально могут привести к нестабильности режима, и черты президентализма, которые наоборот способствуют стабильности государства. Таким образом, будет доказано, что обе системы могут и положительно, и негативно влиять на устойчивость режима, и горизонтальное разделение власти - важный, но не основополагающий пререквизит стабильности демократий.

 

Keywords: power-sharing, presidentialism, parliamentarism, stability, democracy.

Ключевые слова: разделение властей, президентализм, парламентаризм, стабильность, демократия.

 

Introduction

The issue of the ideal form of government includes the debates between presidentialism and parliamentarism in terms of democratic stability.  Some scholars argue that presidentialism is more prone to instability; others emphasize the benefits of separation of powers rather than fusion of powers. In this essay, the position of Juan Linz that presidentialism is less likely than parliamentarism to sustain stable democratic regimes will be disproved by clarifying the drawbacks of parliamentarism and highlighting the features of presidentialism that contribute to stability.

Ideas of Juan Linz and his critical appraisal by Mainwaring and Shugart

Juan Linz [4, p. 12] argues that in presidential systems, there is a challenge of dual legitimacy as both the president and the legislature receive direct mandates from the people. It leads to potential clashes and gridlocks, potentially weakening democratic institutions. Fixed terms for the president and legislature can also result in a deadlock dilemma in case they embody contrasting political views, causing conflicts and political gridlock [4, p. 14]. Besides, presidentialism leads to winner-take-all politics, when opposition is less inclined to cooperate, if the president holds significant power [4, p. 6]. Moreover, it is harder to hold a president accountable for misconduct or incompetence due to difficulties in removing the president [4, p. 14]. All these factors result in increased chances of democratic instability when compared to a parliamentary system.

Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart made a critical appraisal of Juan Linz’s work; however, both authors also highlight the problems that can arise from a lack of cooperation between the executive and legislative branches in presidential systems, which can cause gridlock and instability [5]. Nevertheless, they believe that Linz’s framework needs to be broadened to encompass the variety of presidential systems and the complex interaction of factors that contribute to democratic stability.

Parliamentarism and its potential to instability

To begin with, we should acknowledge the primary advantages of parliamentary systems. Firstly, because the government and the legislature are directly connected, these systems are more responsive and accountable to public opinion. Secondly, the need to form coalitions in parliamentary systems often leads to broader consensus-building and stability. Thirdly, parliamentarism enables greater adaptation to changing circumstances and reduces political disorder, contributing to overall stability.

However, the point I aim to prove is that presidentialism can support democratic stability, whereas parliamentarism may lead to instability. To begin with, the disadvantages of parliamentarism will be discussed. First of all, parliamentary systems often depend on coalitions, which can be fragile and are prone to collapse. It can lead to frequent changes in government, which can cause uncertainty and disrupt policymaking [3, p. 137]. In parliamentary systems, there may be political gridlock when no single party or coalition can achieve a majority, leading to a minority government without a strong mandate that may fall apart [1, p. 221]. Emphasis on legislature in such systems can lead to weakening of the executive branch as well, it makes implementation of policies and creation of laws more difficult. Additionally, because of their focus on gaining and retaining support, such systems may foster an atmosphere that is favorable to political opportunism and backstabbing [2, p. 192]. In addition, under parliamentary systems, snap elections can take place if a government loses a vote of no confidence, leading to political instability and uncertainty [6, pp. 310-311]. Finally, parliamentary systems frequently lead to government by committee, causing instability due to difficulties in establishing clear accountability and leadership.

Empirically, we can refer to Israel, which has a parliamentary system that heavily relies on coalition governments. Israel has had numerous elections and changes in government, resulting in a lack of stability.

Presidentialism and its potential to stability

Now it is worth considering the aspects of presidentialism that can contribute to the stability of democracies. Firstly, the president's legitimacy and accountability are enhanced by the direct election in these systems, as it provides a clear mandate from the people. Secondly, these systems provide stronger executive leadership in times of crisis as they have decisive figures who can respond quickly in periods of uncertainty or national emergencies, ensuring order and stability. Thirdly, strong separation of powers reduces the risk of tyranny or instability caused by an overpowerful executive. Fourthly, these systems help balance extremist movements by using checks and balances mechanisms and the president's popular support to moderate political discussions and hinder the growth of radical ideologies. Also, presidential systems offer a powerful executive branch that is capable of effectively implementing policies and ensuring efficient governance. Moreover, such systems often emphasize constitutionalism and the rule of law, here the president is bound by the constitution and subject to checks and balances, it leads to greater legal certainty and predictability, contributing to stability. It is also worth mentioning that the fixed terms for presidents, unlike the more flexible nature of parliamentarism, can contribute to greater political stability and continuity.

Empirically, we can refer to the United States. Despite its recent political polarization, it remains a stable presidential democracy, mostly due to strong executive power and leadership. Also, the fixed terms for presidents can contribute to greater political stability and continuity, particularly in countries with weak institutions or severe instability. The stability of fragile democracies in Brazil, Mexico, and Chile has been increased by the implementation of presidential systems. Hence, well-designed presidential systems have great potential for democratic stability.

Conclusion

Providing the summary of all mentioned above, presidential systems are capable of creating and sustaining stable democracies as well as parliamentary systems. Along with this, parliamentarism also has weaknesses that can contribute to instability. On balance, both forms of government are capable of creating stability, but democratic stability is not solely determined by the political system. The actual stability of parliamentary and presidential systems relies on multiple factors such as political culture, institutional quality, party system nature, civil society, public trust in institutions, and other characteristics. Each case requires a context-specific approach to institutional design and governance.

 

References:

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  2. Easton D. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. - Wiley, 1967. - 507 с.
  3. Lijphart A. Patterns of Democracy. - Yale University Press, 2012. - 368 с.
  4. Linz J.J. Democracy: Presidential Or Parliamentary, Does it Make a Difference? - American Council of Learned Societies. Comparative Constitutionalism Project. Latin American Regional Institute, Centro de Informaciones y Estudios del Uruguay, 1988. - 80 с.
  5. Mainwaring S., Shugart M.S. Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal // Comparative Politics. - 1997. - №29 (4). - С. 449-471.
  6. Turnbull-Dugarte S.J. Do Opportunistic Snap Elections Affect Political Trust? Evidence from a Natural Experiment // European Journal of Political Research. - 2023. - №62 (1). - С. 308-325.

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