LOBBYING MODELS: THE AMERICAN "FOUNDRY" VERSUS THE EUROPEAN "CORPORATE" SYSTEM

МОДЕЛИ ЛОББИЗМА: АМЕРИКАНСКАЯ «ПЛАВИЛЬНЯ» ПРОТИВ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОЙ «КОРПОРАТИВНОЙ» СИСТЕМЫ

Кирсанова Юлия Евгеньевна

студент, кафедра национальной и региональной экономики, Российский экономический университет им. Плеханова,

РФ, г. Москва

Терехова Юлия Зиновьевна

научный руководитель, старший преподаватель с в/о, Российский экономический университет им. Плеханова,

РФ, г. Москва

ABSTRACT

The article is devoted to a comparative analysis of two dominant lobbying models in the modern world – the American, known as the «foundry», and the European «corporate» system. The historical, theoretical and institutional foundations of each model are considered. Key differences have been identified in the methods of influencing the authorities, the degree of control over the «revolving door» and foreign influence, as well as in the mechanisms for ensuring transparency and sanctions for violations. In conclusion, it is emphasized that there is no ideal model of lobbying, and the future of regulation lies in hybrid approaches combining openness, commitment and an expert component.

АННОТАЦИЯ

Статья посвящена сравнительному анализу двух доминирующих в современном мире моделей лоббизма – американской, известной как «плавильня», и европейской «корпоративной» системы. Рассматриваются исторические, теоретические и институциональные основы каждой модели. Выявлены ключевые различия в методах воздействия на власть, степени контроля за «вращающейся дверью» и иностранным влиянием, а также в механизмах обеспечения прозрачности и санкций за нарушения. В заключении подчёркивается, что идеальной модели лоббизма не существует, а будущее регулирования лежит в гибридных подходах, сочетающих открытость, обязательность и экспертную составляющую.

Keywords: lobbying, American model, European model, corporate system, pluralism, neo-corporatism, transparency, revolving door, foreign influence.

Ключевые слова: лоббизм, американская модель, европейская модель, корпоративная система, плюрализм, неокорпоративизм, прозрачность, «вращающаяся дверь», иностранное влияние.

Lobbying in the modern world has ceased to be a marginal phenomenon of political life, becoming an institutionally designed mechanism for influencing government decision-making. At the same time, fundamentally different approaches to the organization and regulation of lobbying activities have developed in different political systems, which makes the comparative analysis of these models one of the most urgent tasks of modern political science. Of particular scientific and practical interest is the comparison of the two dominant models of lobbying — the American, often referred to as the «smelter», and the European «corporate» system.

The American model of lobbying is based on a solid constitutional foundation – the First Amendment of 1791, which guarantees not only freedom of speech, but also, most importantly, «the right to petition the government». It is this rule that has made lobbying in the United States a legal, institutionalized, and even prestigious activity, which is often referred to as the «fifth branch of government». The theoretical basis is classical political pluralism: society is viewed as a multitude of interest groups independent of the state and competing with each other, and the task of the state is not to ban their influence, but to ensure the most open competition and transparency. The key regulator is the Lobbying Disclosure Act (1995), which introduced strict requirements: mandatory registration of lobbyists and lobbying firms in Congress, regular public reporting on expenses, specific bills and authorities, as well as a strict ban on gifts and compliance with ethical standards. All data is accumulated in the Senate and made publicly available. [2]

The European model of lobbying is based on neocorporativism, the integration of organized interest groups into the decision–making process with an active role of the state. The historical roots go back to medieval guilds and the Catholic doctrine of subsidiarity. The central institution is the Transparency Registry, which, as of 2025, includes 14815 organizations with declared expenses ranging from 1,6 to 2,2 billion euros. The key mechanisms of influence in the EU are not direct financing, but expert competence: participation in expert groups of the European Commission and Comitology. [1]

Next, let's compare lobbying in the United States and Europe by the nature of registration, the main methods of influence, the «revolving door», foreign influence, transparency and sanctions, and the main challenges of these systems.

Table 1.

Comparison of American and European lobbying

An analysis of the two lobbying models suggests that in the United States, lobbying regulation is based on the principles of maximum openness and commitment, reflecting the competitive nature of the American political system. In the EU, the voluntary approach, on the contrary, reflects a model of integration of interests, where the emphasis is not on control, but on the inclusion of stakeholders in the policy-making process. The American system is also vulnerable to direct bribery and money dominance, which they are trying to compensate for by tightening the revolving door rules and foreign influence. The European system, on the contrary, is more susceptible to the risks of covert corporate takeover and opaque lobbying through expert structures. Despite the fundamental differences, there is mutual influence. The EU is gradually moving towards stricter rules and the creation of more mandatory mechanisms, while the United States continues to tighten control over foreign influence, moving closer to European approaches in this matter.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that lobbying as an institution is an integral part of the modern democratic political system. The question is not how to ban it or completely eradicate it, but how to make it as transparent, accountable, and balanced as possible. The experience of the United States and the European Union shows that there is no ideal model, but constant reform, stricter controls and adaptation to new challenges can minimize risks and increase the legitimacy of the government decision-making process. The future of lobbying regulation probably lies in hybrid models combining American openness and commitment with a European emphasis on expertise and institutional dialogue.

Список литературы:

1. Каневский, П. С. Плюралистическая модель лоббизма: критическая рефлексия. [Текст] / П. С. Каневский // Вестник Московского университета. Серия 18. Социология и политология.— 2025. — № 31. — С. 147-166.
2. Холин, Н. Д. Институт лоббизма: специфика функционирования, основные тенденции развития.  [Текст] / Н. Д. Холин // Право и управление. XXI век. — 2025. — № 21. — С. 102-115.
3. Regulatory Capture and Democratic Deficit in the Lobbying Industry: Institutional Failure Analysis 2025 / [Электронный ресурс] // parkco.ai : [сайт]. — URL: https://sparkco.ai/blog/lobbying-industry-regulatory-capture-democratic-deficit (дата обращения: 12.04.2026).
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5. LOBBYING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION / [Электронный ресурс] // ojs.srce.hr : [сайт]. — URL: https://ojs.srce.hr/eclic/article/view/38141 (дата обращения: 12.04.2026).
6. H.R.3554 - Close the Revolving Door Act of 2025 / [Электронный ресурс] // Сongress.gov : [сайт]. — URL: https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/3554/text (дата обращения: 12.04.2026).